Abstract
In this research we have developed experimental designs of the ultimatum game with supervised agents. This agents have unbiased and biased thinking depending on the case. We used Reinforcement Learning and Bucket Brigade to program the artficial agentes. We used simulations and behavior comparison to answer the following questions: Does artificial intelligence reach a perfect subgame equilibrium in the ultimatum game experiment? How would Artificial Intelligence behave in the Ultimatum Game experiment if biased thinking is included in it? This exploratory analysis showed one important result: artificial inteligence by itself doesn´t reach a perfect subgame equilibrium. Whereas, the experimental designs with biased thinking agents quickly converge to an equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrated that the agents with envy bias behaves the same as the ones with altruistic bias.
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Copyright (c) 2023 Julio Añasco, Bryan Josué Naranjo Navas, Pamela Anahí Proaño Mora , Maria Anastasia Vasileuski Kramskova
