Naive realism

A defense from the embodied, embedded and enactive character of perception

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18272/anima.v3i.2862

Keywords:

Philosophy of Perception, naive realism, embodied, embedded, enactive

Abstract

This paper elaborates a defense of naive realism as a theory of perception. The starting point is to demonstrate that abandoning this position and opting for alternative theories is due to admitting the existence of an indissoluble gap between the contents of perception and the way things are in the world. With this in mind, it is argued that the plausibility of such a gap has as presuppositions: a) A world and a mind ontologically independent of each other; b) The passive character of perception; and c) The existence of an essence or noumenic character of objects. Subsequently, it is shown that by replacing presuppositions a) and b) by an embodied, situated, and active approach to perception; such a gap loses plausibility. Finally, presupposition c) is attacked to complete the defense of naive realism, and the peculiarity of the realism accepted here is explained, in that it does not admit pure points of view or knowledge of essences, but is based on the very limited character of human knowledge.

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Author Biography

  • Gabriel Nicolás Cruz, Universidad de Salamanca

    Graduado en Filosofía (2021) por la Universidad de Salamanca y Master en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia: Modulo de Lenguaje y Mente (2022) por la U. Salamanca, la U.Granada y la U. Valladolid. Actualmente he regresado a vivir a mi páis natal (Ecuador) y trabajo como editor adjunto de la Revista Sophia: Colección de Filosofía de la Educación para la Universidad Politécnica Salesiana.

    Mis principales intereses son la epistemología, la filosofía de la mente y la filosofía de la percepción. Trabajo principalmente con enfoques post-analíticos y post-cognitivistas y su relación con la tradición fenomenológico-hermenéutica. Los autores sobre los que giran mis intereses actualmente son: John McDowell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger y Charles Taylor.

    Tengo también intereses secundarios sobre ciertas cuestiones de la filosofía del lenguaje y de lógica. Particularmente me interesan el expresivismo e inferencialismo semánticos; y también la interpretación filosófica de las conscuencias de los grandes teoremas de limitación de la lógica matemática del Siglo XX.

References

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Published

2023-07-14

Issue

Vol. 3 (2023)

Section

Philosophy

License

Copyright (c) 2023 Gabriel Nicolás Cruz

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How to Cite

Cruz, G. N. (2023). Naive realism: A defense from the embodied, embedded and enactive character of perception. Ánima, 3, 39-50. https://doi.org/10.18272/anima.v3i.2862