Relevant markets as a poor method in the determination of market power

Authors

  • Esteban Pérez Universidad San Francisco de Quito USFQ (Quito, Ecuador)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18272/lr.v1i1.868

Keywords:

Competition, antitrust, relevant markets, Subjective Theory, law and economics

Abstract

The relevant markets method has traditionally been used in competition law to determine the dominant position of the parties. Ecuadorian law has adopted this model. Through a legal-economic analysis, this article tries to evidence what the main inconsistencies of this method are. It will show that, regardless of how good the judges may be at the moment of applying them, relevant markets are useless and subject to appearances and arbitrariness, which destroys legal certainty.

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Author Biography

Esteban Pérez, Universidad San Francisco de Quito USFQ (Quito, Ecuador)

Universidad San Francisco de Quito, estudiante del Colegio de Jurisprudencia, Campus Cumbayá, Casilla Postal 17-1200-841, Quito 170901, Ecuador.

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Published

2013-01-01

How to Cite

Pérez, Esteban. “Relevant Markets As a Poor Method in the Determination of Market Power”. USFQ Law Review, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 2013, pp. 40-46, doi:10.18272/lr.v1i1.868.

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2013)

Section

Papers

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