Three Critiques to Laesio Enormis in Real Estate Sales

Abstract

Under the Ecuadorian Civil Code, real estate sale contracts may be judicially rescinded on the grounds of laesio enormis. This happens whenever the seller receives less than one half of the property’s fair price or when the buyer pays more than twice such value. While laesio enormis is formally justified as a mechanism to correct extreme economic imbalance, the rule may be criticized for at least three reasons: (1) it rests on the problematic premise that goods possess an objectively determinable “just price,” overlooking the inherently contingent and market‑driven nature of value formation; (2) it may prove counterproductive, as the legal uncertainty it generates can ultimately harm the very party it purports to protect; and (3) it establishes an unjustified asymmetry by systematically favoring the seller over the buyer, thereby undermining principles of contractual neutrality and equality between the parties.