Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer

Miscelánea

Núm. 20 (2017)

Constitutional adjudication in the system of separation of powers. American impacts in Hungary

DOI
https://doi.org/10.18272/iu.v20i20.893
Submitted
June 10, 2017
Published
2017-12-18

Abstract

Throughout the world one can find two basic models of constitutional adjudication: the American and the Kelsenian ones. At first sight one could easily differentiate them with the mere fact that in the American model there is no separate constitutional court; constitutional adjudication is incorporated into the judicial system. The essay argues that the differentiation is more complicated. The base of distinction is not the existence of a constitutional court. The essay chooses a functional approach and analyses if the activity of constitutional adjudication is closer to the judicial branch or it is "negative legislation" as Kelsen originally thought. Such an approach requires the analysis of separation of powers and the competences of constitutional courts; especially the abstract law review and individual complaint. Hungary"™s new constitution changed the role of the constitutional court. The essay concludes that due to the changes the Hungarian system of constitution adjudication made a great step towards the American model from the Kelsenian one.

viewed = 1018 times

References

  1. Ádám, A. (1996). A közjogi bíráskodás és alkotmányreform. Jogtudományi Közlöny 1996/10, 389-397.
  2. Bibó, I (1981). Az államhatalmi ágak elválasztása egykor és most. In I. Bibó, Bibó István összegyűjtött munkái (pp. 556-558). Bern: Európai Protestáns Magyar.
  3. Csink, L., Schanda B. and Varga A. (2012). The Constitutional Court. In: The Basic Law of Hungary. A First Commentary. Dublin: Clarus.
  4. Dorsen, N. et al. (2003). Comparative Constitutionalism. Cases and Materials. Minnesota: ftomson-West.
  5. Muir Watt, H. (2006). Globalization and Comparative Law. In Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Comparative Law (pp. 401-446). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  6. Favoreu, L. (1995). Az alkotmánybíróságok (The Constitutional Courts). In Alkotmánybíráskodás, alkotmányértelmezés. Budapest: Eto-print.
  7. Gárdos-Orosz, F. (2012). The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Transition - from Actio Popularis to Constitutional Complaint. Acta Iuridica 2012/4, 302-305.
  8. Kelsen, H. (1928). La garantie jurisdictionnelle de la Constitution. Revue de droit public et science politique, XXXV, 197-257.
  9. "” (1946) General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  10. "” (1967). Pure Theory of Law. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  11. Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Government forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  12. McCloskey, R. (1995). Az amerikai LegfelsÅ‘bb Bíróság. In P. Paczolay (eds.) Alkotmánybíráskodás, alkotmányértelmezés (pp. 35-41). Budapest: Etoprint.
  13. Paczolay, P (1995). Alkotmánybíráskodás a politika és jog határán. In P. Paczolay (ed.), Alkotmánybíráskodás, alkotmányértelmezés (pp. 13-19), Budapest: Etoprint.
  14. - (2010). Az élÅ‘ alkotmány: az alkotmánybíráskodás kiszámíthatósága és változásai. In N. Chronowski Nóra and J. Petrétei (eds.), Tanulmányok Ádám Antal professor emeritus születésének 80. évfordulójára. Budapest: Pécs PTE ÁJK.
  15. "” (2012). Megváltozott hangsúlyok az Alkotmánybíróság hatásköreiben. Alkotmánybírósági Szemle 2012/1, pp. 67-69.
  16. Posner, E. and Vermeule, A. (2011). The Executive Unbound. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  17. Sólyom, L. (2007). A magyar Alkotmánybíróság önértelmezése és Hans Kelsen. In C. Kiss Lajos (ed.). Hans Kelsen jogtudománya. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó.
  18. Waldron, J. (2013). Separation of powers in thought and practice? Boston College Law Review, 54, 433-468.
  19. Sentences:
  20. HHC / Hungarian Constitutional CourtDecision (1997). Decision 4/1997, I. 22.