Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer
Iuris Dictio

Dossier

Núm. 21 (2018)

The identity of the constitution and constitutional identity: Opening up a discourse between the Global South and Global North

  • Tímea Drinóczi
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18272/iu.v21i21.1138
Submitted
June 15, 2018
Published
2018-06-26

Abstract

The paper is an invitation to start a public law oriented discourse about the legal concept of "constitutional identity", which is conceived here as the "identity of the constitution". It is seen as a part of the constitution, with which the constituent people/nation can identify with as they created it in the course of constitution-making and constitutional amendment, or which the constitutional interpretation shaped. It can adequately reflect the actual identity of the constituent people, rooted in the past and overarching the future. Provisions that are entrenched by eternity clauses and a multi-tier system of constitutional amendments help to locate the identity of the constitution. This contribution uses the constitutional identity of Hungary as a model to illustrate how and why constitutional identity could become detrimental, with some other EU Member States (Germany and Italy, together with the Court of Justice of the European Union) exemplifying at the same time how the very same constitutional identity can be used to further unify and consolidate European integration. Based on these trains of thought, public discourse about the interrelationship and interdependency of constitutional identity (a non-legal term) and the identity of the constitution (a legal concept) may take place in which experiences of the Global South should feature. Evidences show that the legally conceptualized and applied "identity" of a constitution, which is thus basically seen as a Global North "”more specifically EU"” phenomenon, can be a double-edged sword even in the Global South. Even if it can contribute to the realization of a legal project, such as the EU, or regional human rights protection, and to the greatly strengthened protection and involvement of indigenous and vulnerable peoples in the Global South, in the hands of autocratic and populist leaders and subservient constitutional courts, it can be abused. This abuse can lead to the dismantling of regional and national legal achievements by relying on the very same "identity", which could quickly be turned into autarchy. If it is not abused, the challenge seems to be the reconciliation of new and traditional ideas of constitutionalism, the engine of which must be an independent judiciary.

viewed = 3092 times

References

  1. Bién-Kacala, A. (2016). Polish Constitutional Tribunal: a systemic reform or a hasty political change. DPCE, 25 (1), 153-166.
  2. Bonilla Maldonado, D. (2013). Introduction: Toward a Constitutionalism of the Global South. In D. Bonilla Maldonado (ed.). Constitutionalism of the Global South. The activist tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia (pp. 1-40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. Claes, M. / Reestman, J.-H. (2015). fte protection of national constitutional identity and the limits of European integration at the occasion of the Gauweiler case. German Law Journal, 16(4), 917-970.
  4. Dixon, R. / Landau, D. (2017). Tiered Constitutional Design. George Washington Law Review, 86, 1-65.
  5. Drinóczi, T. (2017). Hungarian Constitutional Court: fte Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System. Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, 11(1), 139-151.
  6. "” (2016). Constitutional politics in contemporary Hungary. Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, 10(1), 63-98.
  7. Drinóczi, T. / Bien-Kacala, A. (2017). Constitutions and constitutionalism captured: shaping illi- beral democracies in Hungary and Poland. Torún: Nicolaus Copernicus.
  8. Fabbrini, F. / Pollicino, O. (2017). Constitutional identity in Italy: European integration as the fulfilment of the Constitution. EUI Working Papers LAW, 1-15.
  9. Faraguna, P. (2017). The Italian Constitutional Court in re Taricco: "Gauweiler in the Roman Campagna".
  10. Fekete, B. (2011). Történeti elemek az EU-tagállamok alkotmány-preambulumaiban. In V. Lamm, B. Majtényi and A. Pap (eds). Preambulum az alkotmányokban (pp. 33-45). Budapest: Complex.
  11. Franck, R. (2005). Why did a majority of French voters reject the European Constitution? European Journal of Political Economy, 21(4), 1071-1076.
  12. Gargarella, R. (2017). The "New" Latin-American constitutionalism. Old Wine in new skin. In A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.). Transformative constitutionalism in Latin America: the emergence of a New Ius Commune (pp. 211-234). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  13. Góngora-Mera, M. E. (2017). The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of a Ius Comu- ne. In A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.). Transformative constitutionalism in Latin America: the emergence of a New Ius Commune (pp. 235-254). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  14. Guim, M. and Verduga, A. (2017). Ecuador"™s "Unstoppable" Constitutional Referendum. ICONect.
  15. Greer, S. C. (2000). The margin of appreciation: interpretation and discretion under the European Convention of Human Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
  16. Jacobsohn, G. J. (2010). Constitutional identity. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
  17. Jakab, A. / Dyevre, A. / Itzcovich, G. (eds) (2013) Comparative Constitutional Reasoning. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press.
  18. Kostadinov, B. (2012). Constitutional identity. Iustinianus Primus Law Review, 3(1), 1-22. Krajewski, M. (2017a). A Way Out for the ECJ in Taricco II: Constitutional Identity or a
  19. More Careful Proportionality Analysis? European Law blog.
  20. "” (2017b). Conditional"™ primacy of EU law and its deliberative value: an imperfect illus- tration from Taricco II. Analysis? European Law blog.
  21. Küpper, H. (2014). Tur Tur, az álóriás - avagy a Grundgesetz örökkévalósági klauzulájának je- lentése a német jogrendszerben. In F. Gárdos-Orosz and Z. Szente, Nemzeti Közszolgá- lati és Tankönyv Kiadó Zrt (pp. 85-89). Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó Zrt.
  22. Landau, D. (2013). Abusive constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Review, 47, 189-260.
  23. López Guerra, L. (2013). National identity and the European Convention of on Human Rights. In A. Saiz Arnaiz and C.
  24. Alcoberro Llivina (eds). National constitutional identity and European integration (pp. 314-321). Cambridge: Intersentia.
  25. Millet, F-X. (2013). L"™Union europèenne et l"™identité constitutionelle des États Members. Paris: LGDJ.
  26. Polga-Hecimovich, J. (2018). Constitutional Change in Ecuador: Improving Democratic Ac- countability and Constraining a Rival.
  27. Polzin, M. (2016). Constitutional identity, unconstitutional amendments and the idea of constituent power: the development of the doctrine of constitutional identity in German constitutional law. ICON International Journal of Constitucional Law, 14, 411-438.
  28. Rosenfeld, M. (2009). The identity of the constitutional subject: selfhood, citizenship, culture, and community. Oxford: Taylor & Francis.
  29. "” (2012). Constitutional Identity. In M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (pp. 756-776). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  30. Rossi, L. (2017). How Could the ECJ Escape from the Taricco Quagmire? Verfassungsblog. On matters constitutional.
  31. Salazar, D. (2017). My power in the Constitution. fte perversion of rule of law in Ecuador. Sela 15.
  32. Śledzińska-Simon, A. (2015). Constitutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective self and its application in Poland. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13(1), 124-155.
  33. Tushnet, M. (2010). How do constitutions constitute constitutional identity. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 8(3), 671-676.
  34. Valdez, D (2017). fte Presidential System in Latin America. A Hallmark and Challenge to a Latin American Ius Constitutionale Comune In A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.). Trans- formative constitutionalism in Latin America: the emergence of a New Ius Commune (pp. 191-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  35. Van der Schyff, G. (2016). EU Member State Constitutional Identity. Zeitschrift für ausslandis- ches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 76(1), 167-191.
  36. Verdugo, S. (2017). How the Bolivian Constitutional Court Helped the Morales Regime to Break the Political Insurance of the Bolivian Constitution, Int"™l J. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 10, 2017.
  37. Von Bogdandy, A. (2015). Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Observations on Transformative Constitutionalism. AJIL Unbound, 109, 109-114.
  38. "” (2017). Ius Costitutionale Commune en América Latina. A Regional Approach to Transfor- mative Constitutionalism. In A. v. Bogdandy et al. (eds.). Transformative constitutio- nalism in Latin America: the emergence of a New Ius Commune (pp. 27-49). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  39. Sentences:
  40. European Court of Human Rights. (2005). Leyla Åžahin v. Turkey, 44774/98. November 10, 2005.
  41. "” (2008). Dogru v. France. 27058/05. December 4, 2008.
  42. "” (2009). Sedjic and Finci v. Bosnia Herzegovina. 27996/06 and 34836/06. June 4th, 2009.
  43. "” (2011). Otegi v Spain. 2034/07. March 15t, 2011.
  44. "” (2014). Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and others v. Hungary, Applications nos. 70945/11, 23611/12, 26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12, 41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12 and 56581/12. April 8, 2014.
  45. Court of Justice of the European Union (2010). Sayn Wittgenstein. C-208/09. December 22, 2010.
  46. "” (2011). RuneviÄ-Vardyn, C-391/09,. May 12, 2011.